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Abstract 
The efficiency and service quality in public administration can be improved by using 
electronic documents (or e-docs) and digital signature to speed up their activity and at 
the same time to better satisfy customer needs. This paper presents an XML-based 
document exchange system that integrates a platform for the management (creation, 
search, storage) of e-docs and a secure trustworthy environment for digitally signing e-
docs. The framework provides security services, like privacy, authorization, 
authentication and non-repudiation. Possibly a mobile terminal equipped with a smart-
card reader and integrating WYSIWYS features could be used for viewing and signing 
e-docs. The proposed system can be easily integrated with the infrastructure (e.g. 
database system) already in use at each administration site. It is described also the use of 
the system in a real world service. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The growth of IT technology and especially of Internet has created the opportunity to 
improve businesses’ and citizens’ access to information and regulation and to facilitate 
contacts, exchanges and feedback between administrations and third parties. However, 
announced and expected change of the delivery, availability of information, transactions 
and services are shaded by the lack of appropriate standard formats for data and signatures 
to be used, concerns about security and legal uncertainty.  
Digital signatures can provide authentication and integrity functions, using signature 
techniques based usually on asymmetric signature keys certified by a trusted Certification 
Authority (CA). Improved formats of digital signatures (called electronic signatures, or ES) 
have begun to be defined since the European Parliament and the Council of European 
Union established the Directive on a common framework for ES [EUdirective]. Probably 
ES laws in different countries will lay also the foundation for the issuing of e-docs by 
public institutions (e.g. administrative bodies, universities) which - digitally signed - will 
be held equal to conventional paper-documents. Nevertheless, so far a standardized format 
to be specifically used for e-docs hasn’t been defined. 
                                                           
1 This wok has been funded by the European Commission under project AIDA (IST-1999-10497). 
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Complexities are met both in the new field of ES and in its applications and during the 
actual design and functional decomposition of a system providing for intelligent e-
administration. Integrated systems must satisfy the requirements related to the generation 
of e-docs, display of e-docs in a way that makes signing of such e-docs free from 
unpleasant surprises and construct enhanced formats of digital signatures with different 
legal values. Such systems must be easily incorporated into already existent administration 
body’ infrastructures (e.g. a database system). Moreover, with the increasing number of 
persons using mobile devices (e.g. personal digital assistants – PDAs), the challenge is to 
improve the functionality of these devices by allowing their users to securely view and sign 
e-docs. The Advanced Interactive Digital Administration (AIDA) system, developed inside 
the homonymous EC-funded project [AIDA], takes up the task of creating a framework 
with the features described above. It implements a secure technical environment for e-
administration and uses it to demonstrate the feasibility of trustworthy digital signatures in 
combination with enhanced e-docs. 
GENERAL FRAMEWORK REQUIREMENTS 
The traditional public administration processes are based on paper documents as illustrated 
in Figure 1. It can be noticed that the main entities generally involved are the citizens and 
the companies (or end-users) and the authority (or administration). The paper-based 
systems usually present several disadvantages due to large amounts of papers handled, 
delays in documents delivery and because the interface between the end-users and the 
authority is primarily done on person or via mail. An electronic system has to support 
public administration services by using e-docs, digital signatures, open networks like 
Internet, electronic registries and other modern tools. The system should provide services 
for both e-administrators (i.e. persons that administer the electronic platform) and for the 
users and should be usable by any e-administration body, no matter if it is a university, a 
public body or a company. 
The basic design requirement of such a system is flexibility to help the e-administrators in 
easy configuration and management and the users in easy but secure e-doc creation and 
signing. Another primary requirement is modularity. This means that all management 
solutions have to maintain the services offered while incorporating new versions and 
variations. Finally a fundamental consideration is to implement the framework to meet an 
adequate level of security, which is an essential property for the system to be effective. 
Among the security requirements we can identify: authentication, authorization, integrity, 
confidentiality, data archiving, chain of custody, non-repudiation. Paper documents pass 
through pre-defined hierarchies that have to be maintained also for e-docs. The term chain 
of custody refers to these rules that are typically enforced using application logic and not 
cryptography. Authentication must be done both for the end users and for e-administrators. 
When accessing a service a user needs to authenticate himself to the E-administration 
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Service Provider (ESP) and in some cases the ESP has to authenticate also to the users. 
Confidentiality is ensured by the encryption of data between clients and servers to prevent 
its exposure over public Internet links. 
 
Figure 1 – General paper model in public administration 
The framework is composed of several services to achieve the design goals. The e-
administrators require services like e-doc creation, revocation, e-doc repository and 
configuration services as well as security service. Users are provided instead with e-doc 
creation, security, signature and e-doc validation services. E-doc creation is performed 
either via editing already created e-docs or are generated by a system component from data 
provided by the user and/or extracted from databases. The signature service permits users 
to digitally sign e-docs by using a trustworthy environment for the creation/verification of 
digital signatures. The term digital signing designates the process by which a digital 
signature can be affixed to an e-doc. E-doc revocation service refers to the possibility to 
revoke e-docs, the repository service ensures the availability of structures used for the 
creation of well-formed e-docs put to users’ disposal, as well as storage of signed e-docs in 
a directory. The e-doc validation service is used to ensure that an e-doc is valid at a certain 
time. The users are guaranteed that an e-doc has exactly the content specified by an e-
administrator in an appropriate structure. For example no hidden fields are allowed in an e-
doc. The same service has to provide also techniques for long-term validity of signed e-
docs like signing the complete signed document with a stronger algorithm before the old 
algorithms cease being secure. The e-administrators can set up the platform using the 
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configuration service. The acknowledgement service is providing a signed feedback to the 
user confirming the receipt of the e-doc. On the other side, in the same service, it is 
necessary to supply the means for logging the process’ progress (log module). Security 
service is required both by users and e-administrators. It has to ensure maximum security 
for access and information management and must respond to the security requirements 
mentioned above. Publishing service allows each e-administration body to freely use a 
directory most suitable for their needs to make information public. 
AIDA OVERVIEW 
Many pieces already exist, various document management systems implement 
organizational workflows in proprietary manner. To enable AIDA a number of tasks have 
to be addressed. First is a trustworthy environment must be defined and implemented. 
Another task is to define machine-readable data structures for e-docs. In the end, a 
management platform for e-docs has to be implemented, that is an environment for 
generation of e-docs, including a secure infrastructure that support the whole life cycle of 
an e-doc and a platform utilized by users to display and verify the e-docs’ content and 
signatures applied on them. The system must use the back-end and front-end already 
existent and in use at each administration side. This means for example that the public 
bodies don’t have to modify their currently used Database Management System when 
adding support for AIDA. To create a trustworthy environment, all components have to be 
trustworthy to contribute to an overall secure solution. The signature creation device (SCD) 
must make forging of signatures as difficult as possible by requiring an active user 
confirmation before signing anything. Entering a PIN, a fingerprint or any other 
authenticating information should ideally be done directly on the SCD. The SCD must be 
embedded into a secure environment that also makes forging signatures difficult. This 
environment is responsible for preparing the data to be signed and to be sent to the SCD for 
hashing and signing. As the SCD might not be capable of displaying the data to be signed, 
the security of this environment and the binding to the SCD is crucial for the overall 
functionality of the system. [Heiberg2000] explains clearly the types of attacks that can be 
performed on signing environments. Ideally, the SCD and the signature environment are 
integrated into one component. Displaying the data correctly is also very important. 
Correctly means that the user sees exactly the data he is going to sign and nothing else. A 
secure signature environment must therefore be able to parse and understand data and 
reject signing data that contain illegal parts, which are unknown to the display unit. 
Examples of illegal contents are white text on white background or unknown HTML-tags 
etc. We call this module the What You See Is What You Sign (WYSIWYS) module.  
AIDA’s objectives are to create and to incorporate all existing components needed to 
provide secure signature environment. It will provide a software-only solution and an 
appropriate solution for secure signing equipment. For example, the software-only solution 
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is to be used with different platforms and could differ from the solution for secure signing 
equipment which could be limited by power, computational or network capabilities of the 
signing device used. To a large extent, a software-only solution must rely on the 
environment, as it contributes largely to the security of the system. Even if such a solution 
cannot provide perfect security sometimes this is not absolutely required. Features like the 
ability to display the data to be signed accurately will still be very useful and appropriate 
for mass-market. Alternatively, small personal devices, like notebooks or PDAs that are 
equipped with a smart-card reader and that integrate WYSIWYS features, seem to be the 
ideal solution for secure signing equipment: the devices are small and can be carried 
around easily, while the display is usually still capable of displaying different forms of data 
to be signed [Heiberg2000, Boneh1999]. 
PRESENTATION OF THE AIDA ARCHITECTURE 
AIDA framework conforms to a web application architecture, which typically follows an n-
tier model (Figure 2). The first tier is the presentation layer, which includes not only the 
web browser but also the web server, which is responsible for assembling the data into a 
presentable format. The second tier is composed of the application layer and consists 
basically of the code, which the user calls upon through the presentation layer to retrieve 
the desired data. It is further the task of the presentation logic to receive the data and format 
it for display. The third tier contains the data that is needed for the application and could 
consist of any source of information. The data source is not limited to just an enterprise 
database like Oracle but could include also a set of XML [Bray1998] documents or a 
directory service like an LDAP server. The middle tier is extended to allow multiple 
application objects. The application objects each have an interface, which allows them to 
work together. In our particular case, the database backend already existent at an ESP will 
work together with AIDA server (or AIDA platform, named further Aplatform) through 
interfaces implemented at application layer to supply data to the presentation layer. The 
presentation and the application levels are incorporated into the Scenario Application 
Framework (SAF) as illustrated in Figure 3. 
Functionality. Client-server paradigm is used to implement the overall system. This 
architecture also takes the form of a server-to-server configuration that is one server plays 
the role of a client and request services (e.g. database service) from another server. The 
Aplatform communicates via AIDA commands (or Acommands) with client applications 
using a nonstandard application protocol named AIDA protocol (or Aprotocol). Every 
Aplatform operation is explicitly requested by the SAF, which implements the actual 
service workflow. The SAF is responsible for interaction with the web-server component 
that will surely be present in any scenario to provide the user with an appropriate web 
portal. It gathers also proprietary data through appropriate interfaces and communicates 
with the Aplatform for specific functions like e-doc creation, display and verification. Two 
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equivalent application ports with similar functionality, called the scenario and service 
ports, are used to access the Aplatform. These ports can be configured to allow an ESP to 
freely choose the openness of the system that is they are used to receive or send back 
messages directly or via gateway programs. The ports can be set up for two types of 
settings: to specify the set (full or restricted) of Acommands accepted by the port and to 
indicate the outside visibility of the port. The gateway programs are simple programs that 
tunnel commands from one port to another one and connects clients situated outside the 
ESP’s intranet to the Aplatform. This permits the SAF to be situated anywhere in the 
Internet or in the ESP’ intranet. The administration port is a special port used to start/stop 
the other ports and to accept Aplatform administration functions. 
 
Figure 2 – General architecture 
The Aprotocol uses signed XML structures for the AIDA messages (commands, responses) 
exchanged. A special Document Type Definition (DTD) is used for the syntax of these 
messages. AIDA messages can be sent directly to the Aplatform using the Aprotocol or 
tunneled via HTTP to the gateways that send them to the Aplatform on dedicated ports. The 
Security Service Bricks (SSB) are the modules that support the security service and enable 
most of AIDA’ secure functionality like support for smart cards, SSL or XML signatures. 
Smart cards. Smart cards are secure, portable computing devices capable of storing 
sensible information and compute digital signatures and other cryptographic primitives 
[Vedder1998, Okamoto1999]. This project considers the use of smart cards for two 
purposes, that is cards are used to uniquely identify a user inside an organization 
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(authentication) and to produce digital signatures by storing private keys and the 
corresponding X.509v3 public key certificates. 
 
Figure 3 – Interconnection between Scenario Application Framework and AIDA platform 
Authentication. AIDA employs the Secure Socket Layer [SSL] to ensure channel integrity, 
authentication and privacy. Server and client authentication are based on X.509v3 
certificates. Server authentication enables clients to verify the server they are 
communicating with. Client authentication allows servers to verify the client’s identity and 
use it as a basis for access-control decisions. One aspect to keep in mind is the separation 
of keys for authentication purposes and for digital signing when the system has to be 
conformant with signature laws. Thus, different key pairs must be used for those purposes 
and the PINs to trigger the creation of a signature must be different for these keys. One 
difficulty that has to be addressed at the level of the SAF is the user’s authentication that is 
verifying the identity of the client interacting with the Aplatform. For this purpose the 
user’s certificate has to contain public data uniquely identifying him in an organization, 
like an identity card number. To avoid the insertion of the ID data in the user’s certificate 
(because for example some users simply don’t want their identity card number to be public) 
alternative solutions would be to use an explicitly map a user’s certificate to user ID data in 
specialized store on the Aplatform or to put user ID data on the user’ smart card into 
special files instead inside the user’s certificate. This is called a personalized smart card 
because it contains files with identification information chosen by the institution. The SAF 
checks the user’s identity. Consequently, it is up to ESP to personalize the smart cards such 
that the SAF can easily use the data on the card. 
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Role system. Every command sent to the Aplatform is signed with the private key paired to 
a public key certificate used for authorization purposes called role certificate. These can be 
any certificates the ESP wants to use and it is not compulsory for them to have high level 
of assurance or to be issued by certain CAs. The Aplatform checks whether the role has the 
privileges to execute the requested command by looking at the role map. This map assigns 
each role with all Acommands and e-doc types that are allowed for it. Most of the 
commands have also e-docs that they operate on. So, besides allowing only certain 
commands to be executed by a specific role, the Acommand’s execution can be further 
restricted by defining a set of e-doc types it is allowed to operate on. This mechanism 
allows different users to use the same Acommand set but each one can only work on the 
specific type of e-docs he is responsible for. 
E-Doc Format. The system is not intended to introduce completely new and proprietary 
document formats: AIDA uses XML [Bray1998] for several reasons. First, this format 
supports strict separation of content and presentation. Document formats in use today 
(PDF, Word, HTML) usually mix up data and presentation, making them inappropriate to 
use when the same information need to be presented differently. Any format mixing 
presentation and content and that allows active content is also risky to sign: macros, white 
fonts on white background are only some of the threats. Moreover, some of the formats 
(e.g. Word’s .doc files) have non-public definitions and hence cannot be used in security-
critical applications. Another reason is that XML allows also including the DTD into the e-
docs. Thus, attacks as described in [Heiberg2000] performed by a malicious individual 
when using HTML documents, will be avoided. The attack is based on the fact that an 
HTML document is viewed differently with an ASCII-editor as a source code and with a 
web browser and an attacker could include text as comments. Web browsers do not render 
comments and signer cannot view what he’s signing unless he views the source file. When 
using this format, a display module can apply advanced filtering techniques for displaying 
XML documents (or XML docs) in a trustworthy manner to be used for signing and 
verification [KarlS2001]. Consequently, AIDA is focused on XML docs and on signed 
XML docs as well. One task to be solved when using XML for secure information 
exchange is the implementation of a standard for signed XML as defined in [Eastlake2001] 
and this is incorporated into the WYSIWYS module. Another task is the conversion of 
relational database data to and from XML in the simplest way. 
AIDA Platform 
The Aplatform (Figure 4) is located inside the ESP’s intranet and in real-life scenario it 
should run on a dedicated machine in a high-security area. The server is installed and 
configured using the administration console by the e-administrator, under strict security 
measures. Example configuration tasks are setting and updating the role map or specifying 
the data types and styles for the e-docs. The ESP applications, generally called Scenario 
Applications (SA), implement the workflows for various e-doc services. For this purpose 
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the SAs interact with the Aplatform and with the user interfaces (browser, WYSIWYS 
client). The Aplatform must not be confused with the web server that interacts with the 
users and runs SAs that in turn communicate with the inside Aplatform. The Application 
Server (AS) acting as a web server is the connection point for service users while the 
Aplatform is never visible externally. The definitions repository contains specifications and 
meta-information for the creation and verification of XML docs, like DTDs and stylesheets 
and internal data for the authority. The document directory contains every signed e-doc 
created by a user or organization. 
 
Figure 4 – AIDA platform 
WYSIWYS Module 
The AIDA’s WYSIWYS software (client) satisfies some rough requirements: 
a) View e-docs. The device should display the e-docs in a reliable and trustworthy fashion 
so that the user can view it. 
b) Sign e-doc. The signature should be authentic and not forgeable. 
c) Verify e-docs. The system should be able to verify a signed document and display the 
result in a clear and unambiguous way. 
d) Create legally binding signatures. Official parties should accept signatures created with 
this system. 
e) Little or no maintenance required. The program should not require regular program 
update or installation or if absolutely necessary this should be as easy as possible. 
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The modularity of the WYSIWYS code reflects the system structure in a clear way. Even 
though the system is primarily focused on XML docs, it should be possible to extend it to 
support other document formats as well. The WYSIWYS module incorporates a XML 
viewer for displaying XML docs, a library for signing XML docs and a cryptographic 
library for digital signing that makes use of smart cards to generate signatures. A solution 
for enabling Java applications to create digital signatures directly on cryptographic smart 
cards is shown in [KarlS2000]. The framework consists of several packages including only 
interfaces, abstract classes and generic code common to all documents. Classes that are 
needed for all documents are placed in separate packages. Examples of such classes are 
classes to access services of the Aplatform like getting the e-doc’ status. 
Scenario Desktop 
The Scenario Desktop (SD) is a Graphical User Interface (GUI) tool for interactive 
operations and handling of e-docs. Persons called referents that are responsible for certain 
tasks use this tool to model the operations in the ESP’s workflows that need human 
processing. The referents can view, create, store, sign and search for specific e-docs stored 
on the Aplatform. To modify e-doc’ status the e-doc attributes are defined. They allow the 
Aplatform to fulfill a variety of functions and support various models of e-doc structures, 
meta-information and e-doc workflows of various ESPs. No single system could be built to 
incorporate every aspect of e-doc management preferred by an ESP and his existent 
business logic. To handle Aplatform’s data stores as needed (e.g. to partition the document 
directory into input and output e-doc parts), to add specific data to e-docs (e.g state) or to 
configure type-specific data need by the SAF (e.g. to mark some fields as optional) the so-
called attributes are used to hold information needed by the ESP. AIDA uses three levels 
of attributes whose description and usage is not part of the present paper. To understand the 
case study presented further, we’ll just state that an attribute is used to store the e-doc’ 
status (e.g. pending). Unlike static attributes, which are set once at the Aplatform start-up 
and never changed later, these are dynamic attributes because they can be read and written 
by the SD. Referents can create output e-docs using field data extracted from one or more 
existing XML e-docs serving as input source called input e-docs as well as field data 
entered directly via the GUI. The connection between the input and output e-docs is not 
represented in the definitions repository but it is specified using processing rules inserted 
into an XML configuration file named properties file. Fields in the output e-doc not 
automatically filled by the application after applying the processing rules must be 
presented to the referent in a dialog box and their values must be entered manually. 
The role system sets up restrictions on the e-doc types each referent is allowed to generate 
and view. The role certificates allow access control by restricting the referent’s actions to 
the ones her employer (ESP) sets up according to his internal responsibility scheme. In 
practice, the SD signs every command sent to the Aplatform with a private key and attach 
the role certificate (containing the pair public key) to be checked against the role map. If 
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the requested command and/or e-doc type is not allowed for that role, the request will be 
rejected. The SD interacts with the Aplatform either directly to the scenario port or 
indirectly via gateway programs that forwards requests to the scenario port. The latter case 
is very useful and necessary when the SD is run outside ESP’s intranet. The 
communication between the SD (acting as client) and the Aplatform is completely 
transparent because it is handled within the application support library. This library 
provides a number of classes and methods that resemble functionality which is either 
directly executed on the client’ side or implicitly involves an Aplatform communication 
using the Aprotocol. 
CASE STUDY 
The implementation of a real service based on AIDA involves the interconnection of 
several components, some of which are not (and cannot be) part of the Aplatform itself. 
This holds especially for the actual workflow logic that connects to proprietary resources to 
query user data or other information necessary to complete e-doc processing. This section 
describes a pilot service based on AIDA to be used inside Politecnico di Torino (Polito), 
i.e. the exam admission service (EAS). This is a widely and frequently used service inside 
any education institute and is a good candidate for e-administration due to the large 
spectrum of users and paper documents usually involved. 
Current Service Organization 
Inside Polito the requests for exam admissions are collected at the Student Service Office 
(SSO). The requests are made from a special networked terminal called totem. Totems are 
secure devices that act as front-ends for the SSO services and are similar in some way with 
the Automated Teller Machines (ATM) because they permit users to make payments too. 
Totems have dedicated communication links with servers inside SSO and with servers 
inside banks because some of the services available require payments. One of the services 
available is the EAS (Figure 5). After authenticating the student a number of checks 
completely transparent to the user are performed by the AS: the student’s enrollment status, 
the rights to do the exam, the payment situation. Upon completion of these checks the 
totem generates an auto-sticking paper exam admission card (EAC) containing student and 
exam specific data. The EAC is valid for a whole exam session (i.e. 6 weeks, that includes 
3 exam rounds) but getting the EAC is not a method for actually booking for a specific 
exam at a date with a certain professor. Besides the data regarding the student (e.g. ID 
number, place of birth), the faculty (e.g. name), the exam (e.g. and name, date), EAC 
related data (e.g. validity period), the EAC contains also two exam evaluation tickets 
(EETs). The EAC is signed by the responsible of the SSO. The EETs contain the same data 
for student, faculty and validity period as the EAC. Additionally they have blank fields to 
be filled in by the professor after the exam (e.g. the mark). At exam time each student must 
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give the professor the paper EAC to prove that he is can do the exam in that session. After 
examination the professor fills in the blank fields in the auto-sticking EETs, puts them in 
the registry, writes some extra data in the registry (like questions put at the exam), signs the 
registry and finally sends it to the SSO to be processed. Processing the registry means 
tearing off the right part containing one EET and the extra data. Next the registry 
containing only one EET in the first column is returned to the professor for his archive and 
to use the remaining empty pages. 
 
Figure 5 – Current paper-based Exam Admission Service 
Proposed Service Organization 
An improved service could be offered by using an appropriate signed e-doc instead of the 
paper EAC to provide proof of identity and authority (Figure 6). The student can continue 
to make exam admission requests using the totem and the web interface running on the 
client PC within the totem. Additionally the student can establish SSL-client authenticated 
sessions when connecting to the AS remotely (e.g. from home). Instead of the paper EAC 
the AS issues a signed exam admission card in electronic form (e-EAC). This e-doc 
contain only exam related data and to uniquely identify the student inside Polito and 
doesn’t include any more data from the EET, which will be put in a separate e-doc called e-
EET. At exam time the student can prove that he registered for the exam in two ways. 
Either he brings the e-EAC stored on a floppy disk and lets the professor check its 
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correctness using a terminal (PC or mobile device) that runs WYSIWYS client. Another 
way would be for the professor to use the terminal to connect to the AS and extract the e-
EACs via a search Acommand from the Aplatform, by using data provided by the student. 
 
Figure 6 – Proposed electronic Exam Admission Service 
After the examination, the professor uses the SD to process all the e-EACs stored on the 
Aplatform for that exam. The e-EAC status of is kept in an attribute field. Normally all e-
EACs for an exam should be pending. As result of the search command, one line is 
inserted in the working screen for every e-EAC to be processed, together with visible 
student ID data. The SD applies processing rules for generating an e-EET from an e-EAC. 
To accomplish this the SD calls first a support library function to open an e-EAC into 
separate fields. Inside the window screen there will be noticed field data extracted from e-
EAC (as read-only) and additionally there are text boxes for the fields related to the exam 
(e.g. date, mark) to be still filled in by the professor. Upon data’s insertion the SD triggers 
the WYSIWYS module that gets appropriate transformation rules for e-EET from the 
Aplatform according to the user/display capabilities set on professor’s PC. At this point the 
professor can view and sign the e-EET. Finally the WYSIWYS client sends an answer in 
the form of signed e-EET (or error code) to the Aplatform to store it and to set its status to 
issued. The originally selected input e-EAC e-doc’ status is set to processed. When using a 
mobile terminal the performed steps should be similar as described above except that the 
device’s browser and an internal smart card reader are used. In the end the professor could 
get a copy of the signed e-EET sent by AS to his e-mail box and in the same time, another 
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copy may be sent to a printer or to a hard disk for archiving. 
Implementation Aspects 
The model adopted for Polito’s infrastructure is Oracle’s Internet Computing Architecture. 
It comprises a three-tier architecture with a thin client, an application server and an Oracle 
database on the back end. The client runs a Java application using a Java-enabled web 
browser and sends user requests to the form servers situated at application tier level. The 
client tier always talks to the application tier, never directly to the database tier. A totem is 
composed of a PC, a printer, an UPS, an adjustable monitor and is network connected. The 
Netscape browser is started in super kiosk mode allowing it to run in a frameless window. 
The SA is implemented as a set of Java servlets (gateway and application) running on the 
AS. They communicate on one side with the Aplatform and with the database server and on 
the other side with the user as a typical web application. This means that it collects data 
from the user via HTML forms, sends a request to the web server, runs the requested 
servlet, formats the output in HTML or in the format accepted by the AIDA’s display unit 
and sends it back to the browser or to WYSIWYS module for display. Oracle Internet 
Application Server has been used for deploying and managing Internet applications inside 
Polito. The incoming requests are processed by Oracle HTTP Server (based on Apache) 
and are directed toward the Apache Jserv servlet engine via the Apache JServ protocol. 
Proprietary data are extracted from an Oracle database over the network using JDBC. With 
support for AIDA the present three-tiers architecture is extended to an n-architecture 
because the number of data sources increases. The web server performs client 
authentication to grant user’s access to certain important functions for the workflow. 
Hence, issues like professor’s identification and preventing one professor to see the 
examination data of another professor lies solely under the control of the SA. Gateway 
servlets tunnel Acommands exchanged with the Aplatform coming from outside the Polito 
intranet. When exam admission requests are made from home, the user must download and 
install the WYSIWYS software from the Polito’s web site. Installation involves a 
registration process for automatic application launch from within the web browser on 
receipt of special file types. X.509 certificates are issued by the EuroPKI CA [EuroPKI]. 
This is a non-profit organization established to create and develop a pan-european public-
key infrastructure and it is derived from the EC-funded ICE-TEL and ICE-CAR projects. It 
provides public-key certification services to the wide European Internet community to 
support borderless network security. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
This paper introduced the goals and the features of a general framework for e-
administration and presented the design and work done so far in the AIDA project. The 
main objective of this project is to design a secure and flexible framework that enhances 
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public services. The adopted solution is based on the use of e-docs in XML and embedded 
digital signatures and satisfies the main requirements of a secure administration system. 
The paper shows also how the outcome of the project can be applied to implement a 
complex case study, making it appropriate to any real social environment. Further efforts 
include extension of the system to support parallel signatures, chain of custody, enhanced 
formats of electronic signatures and mobile devices with reduced computing capabilities. 
REFERENCES 
[AIDA] Advanced Interactive Digital Administration, http://aida.infonova.at/ 
[Boneh1999] Boneh D., Daswani N., Experimenting with electronic commerce on the 
PalmPilot, Financial Cryptography’99, vol. 1648 of LNCS, pp. 1-16, 
Springer-Verlag, 1999 
[Bray1998] Bray T., Paoli J., Sperberg-McQueen C.M., Extensible Markup Language 
(XML) 1.0, W3C Recommendation, February 10, 1998. 
http://www.w3.org/TR/1998/REC-xml-19980210 
[Eastlake2001] Eastlake D., Reagle J., Solo D., XML-Signature Syntax and Processing, 
RFC 3075, IETF, 2001 
[EUdirective] The European Parliament and the Council, European Directive on 
Electronic Signature, 1999, 
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/ecommerce/legal/digital.html 
[EuroPKI] http://www.europki.org 
[Heiberg2000] Freudenthal M., Heiberg S., Willemson J., Personal Security 
Environment on Palm PDA, Proceedings, Computer Security 
Applications Conference, ACSAC'00, 2000, pp. 366-372 
[KarlS2000] Scheibelhofer K., Using OpenCard in Combination with the Java 
Cryptographic Architecture for Digital Signing, Proceedings, GEMPLUS 
Developer Conference GDC’2000, 20-21 June 2000, Montpellier, France 
[KarlS2001] Scheibelhofer K., What You See Is What You Sign - Trustworthy Display 
of XML Documents for Signing and Verification, Proceedings, CMS 2001 
Conference, Darmstadt, Germany, 21-22 May 2001, pp. 3-13 
[Okamoto1999] Okamoto T., Tada M., Okamoto E., Extended Proxy Signatures for Smart 
Cards, Information Security, vol. 1729 of LNCS, pp. 247-258, Springer-
Verlag, 1999 
[SSL] http://home.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/ssl-toc.html 
[Vedder1998] Vedder K., Weikmann F., Smart Cards – Requirements, Properties, and 
Applications, State of the Art in Applied Cryptography, vol. 1528 of 
LNCS, pp. 307-331, Springer-Verlag, 1998 
